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Abstract 
This paper presents a stylized mechanism aimed at dealing with the cross-border agency 
problems that arise in supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups in the 
European Union (EU). The authors assume that PCA policies have been implemented 
by the national supervisors and explore the institutional changes needed in Europe if PCA is 
to be effective as an incentive compatible mechanism. The paper identifies these changes 
starting with enhancements in the availability of information on banking groups to 
supervisors. Next, the paper considers the collective decision making by supervisors with 
authority to make discretionary decisions within the PCA framework as soon as a bank of a 
cross-border banking group falls below the minimum capital standard. Finally, the paper 
analyzes the coordination measures that should be implemented if PCA requires the bank to 
be resolved. 
 
JEL classification numbers: G28, K23, F20. 
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Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has been fostering the development of regional and pan-European 
banks as a part of its efforts to develop a single financial market.1 However, the creation of 
such large banks leaves the region vulnerable to financial distress or failure of an important 
cross-border bank.2 This means that the existing national authorities, including supervisors, 
central banks and ministries of finance have to work out together how to handle these 
banks and any problems they may encounter. Cross-border conflicts about appropriate bank 
supervision are inevitable in this context, especially when large bank groups become 
systemically important in more than one country and each of the group’s national supervisors 
are accountable to a different group of voters and taxpayers.3 
While the EU has harmonized some aspects of banking policy, such as capital 
regulation and minimum deposit insurance requirements, there are no standards for 
determining when a bank is insolvent, no common standards for bank resolution, no 
agreement on how to share any costs of recapitalization or resolution, no clear common 
objective of what is to be achieved in resolution, and no common decision making structure 
across countries.4 The result is that the resolution of a failing cross-border bank could be 
determined by the laws and decisions of the bank’s home supervisor without any obligation 
to take in account the impact on other affected countries or any direct accountability to those 
states or the EU as a whole. 
This paper takes the view that the weaknesses in the current system for dealing with 
failing cross-border banks can be addressed by harmonizing the supervisory treatment of 
distressed and failing banks, including a mechanism to coordinate supervisory policies across 
national boundaries. This approach would be consistent with the existing decentralized 
bank supervisory structure in the EU. Moreover, the creation of a common rule book and 
mandatory coordination of actions on cross-border banks would limit the scope for 
self-interested behavior by national supervisors at the expense of other countries and facilitate 
ex post accountability.5, 6 
                                                                          
1. We refer to the European Union (EU) throughout but these remarks actually apply to the wider European Economic 
Area (EEA) including Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, where the same legal framework is in force. 
2. While this paper is set in an EU context, the same issues also arise in other cross-border banking contexts. What is 
unique about Europe is the range of possible solutions. In contrast to most other cross-border banking situations, 
the goal of a single financial market precludes European countries from adopting a New Zealand style solution 
[as discussed by Mayes (2006c)] that requires foreign banks be able to operate as stand-alone entities. On the other 
hand, EU Directives create the potential for implementing common rules and cross-border coordination that would be 
very difficult to adopt in other multilateral settings. 
3. We do not attempt a full definition of systemic importance but use the behavioral that a bank is of systemic 
importance in a particular country if the authorities are not willing to see some or all of its operations close 
without intervention. Although similar in some respects to the concept of “too big to fail”, we place no restriction 
on whether the bank's current legal personality might not be terminated and the bank reopened in full or in part under 
new ownership without any cessation in the systemically critical functions. 
4. Under insolvency the job of the receiver is to maximize the value of the insolvency estate. In bank resolution in the US 
the FDIC is required to act so as to minimize its own losses. But in the special case of large banks, where there might be 
a wider impact on the economy, other factors could the taken into account. (This is known as the Systemic Risk 
Exemption [Mayes (2006b)], which has not as yet been invoked.) Such objectives are typically not spelled out in the EU 
and not agreed among the member states. 
5. The related question of the relationship of the bank supervisor to the lender of last resort when dealing with 
cross-border banking groups is also important but it is beyond the scope of this paper. See Repullo (2004), and Kahn 
and Santos (2002 and 2004). 
6. Čihák and Decressin (2007) offers an appraisal of a European Banking Charter, which is a fully fledged EU-level 
supervisory regime that would operate alongside the national regimes. 
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A more obvious and more radical solution would be to introduce an EU-level regime 
to handle these cross-border banks but in recognition of the lack of political enthusiasm 
for this at present, we build on the existing supervisory and other regulatory institutions in the 
EU to the extent feasible. We identify gaps between what presently exists and what is needed 
for effective prudential supervision, deposit insurance and reorganization of cross-border 
banking groups, some of which can only be covered by substantial changes to existing 
legislation in the EU countries. While the general approach to disciplining large cross-border 
banking groups advocated in this paper provides an opportunity for an effective system in the 
absence of EU-level institutions, this paper does not consider the desirability of EU-level 
institutions and arrangements should they become politically feasible. 
The current efforts to work out burden-sharing arrangements are likely to aggravate 
the conflicts between home and host country supervisors. The problem with burden sharing 
is that it can increase the exposure of host countries to home country supervision while 
reducing the cost to the home country of inadequate supervision and supervisory 
forbearance. As such, it is more likely to aggravate the existing agency problems than to 
mitigate those problems. 
A critical element underlying our proposal is the adoption of an effective version of 
what is labeled “prompt corrective action” (PCA), as the common rule book for dealing with 
inadequately capitalized and failing banks.7 First adopted by the United States, PCA provides 
a set of mandatory and discretionary corrective actions to be taken by bank supervisors as a 
bank’s capital ratio declines, culminating in resolution (withdrawal of the bank charter and 
takeover of the bank by the authorities) before the bank’s capital reaches zero. European 
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (1998), Benink and Benston (2005), Mayes (2004), 
and Nieto and Wall (2006) all discuss the potential benefits of a PCA type structure at the EU 
Member State level but without coordinating mechanisms. 
The advantages of PCA for dealing with cross-border banking problems are not 
restricted to the collaborative approach we explore. PCA would also facilitate the 
development of EU level supervision and deposit insurance [Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2006)]. 
PCA seeks to avoid the need for burden sharing in two ways. First, it reduces the risk of bank 
failure by requiring firm supervisory intervention at relatively high levels of capital to try to stop 
the problem from escalating. Second, if a bank’s condition continues to deteriorate, PCA 
requires that its charter be taken away while the bank’s regulatory capital is still positive. 
Thus, PCA would eliminate, or at worst substantially reduce, the burdens to be shared under 
any burden sharing arrangement. In our context, the minimum supervisory responses to the 
deterioration in a bank’s condition and the additional discretionary actions that may be taken, 
which would be laid down in the common PCA rule book, both set bounds to the 
cross-country supervisory coordination problem. PCA provides a clear goal which facilitates 
supervisory accountability both to the supervisor’s own government and to other supervisors 
and limits governments’ exposure to losses from a failed bank by setting a clear closure rule. 
The form of PCA applied in the US poses two problems for its implementation in 
Europe. First, PCA was designed to work with the institutional structure of U.S. bank 
regulation and U.S. banks. Nieto and Wall (2006) identify several institutional changes 
that would be needed in European bank regulatory institutions in order for PCA to be effective 
(described in the second section of this article). Second, acceptance of PCA is often taken as 
                                                                          
7. The access to a broad and equal range of supervisory measures throughout the EU is in line with the objective of 
supervisory convergence of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). 
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acceptance of the US practice of using the leverage ratio as the primary measure of a bank’s 
financial condition.8 This is not necessary. While the leverage ratio has some advantages, it 
also has the increasingly important disadvantage of not recognizing the complex risk 
management strategies adopted by leading banks and activities recorded off-balance sheet.9 
An effective PCA could be based entirely on a transparent system of risk-based capital 
measures.10 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section analyzes the potential problems 
with the current institutional framework of bank supervision. The second section evaluates the 
potential contribution of adopting a PCA type regime in setting minimally acceptable 
supervisory responses. As the second section discusses, PCA was developed for banks 
operating in the US and, as such, does not address some important cross-border concerns. 
Thus, the third section considers additional measures that may be taken to supplement PCA 
and make it more responsive to cross-border issues. After the last section concludes, an 
Appendix develops several scenarios that highlight the differences between the current 
European situation and a Europe that had adopted PCA and authorized colleges of the 
relevant supervisors to make any discretionary decisions required under PCA. 
                                                                          
8. However, the U.S. legislation authorizing PCA (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 
FDICIA) allows the use of risk-based capital standards to categorize a bank’s condition and U.S. regulations use 
risk-based thresholds for all but the lowest level of capital adequacy (critically undercapitalized) as set out in Table 3, 
so even there the importance of the leverage ratio should not be exaggerated. 
9. The principal advantage of the leverage ratio is that simplifies the monitoring of supervisory implementation of PCA. 
10. Whatever capital measures are used, we recommend that it be backed up by the supplemental use of observable 
market-based risk measures. Valuations can become particularly distorted when an institution comes under pressure 
and a conservative approach that tends to indicate the existence of problems is to be preferred for resolution authorities. 
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1 Supervisory discretion and cross-border banking 
Cross-border groups increasingly operate as integrated entities with provision of services, 
such as risk management, liquidity management, data processing, and loan evaluation, each 
centralized in one part of the group (though not all services are necessarily centralized in the 
same country). They often do not have a neat structure of a parent and free-standing 
locally incorporated subsidiaries, but a complex interweaving of branches and subsidiaries 
that cannot survive on their own. In this context, bank supervisory structures must also be 
structured for efficient cross-border operations. The need for efficient cross-border prudential 
supervision implies someone has to be clearly responsible, it needs a clear objective whose 
attainment can be transparently and objectively assessed and, most importantly, it needs the 
tools and powers to undertake the tasks efficiently and effectively in practice and in prospect. 
This has long been recognized in the work of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors 
[Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (1997)]11. Some authority has to take 
the lead, normally one in the “home” country where the bank or holding company is 
headquartered, and the other, “host” country authorities have to co-operate with them and 
with each other if the system is to work. Moreover, since there are multiple authorities in each 
country, whose range of powers and competences often do not match, this coordination is 
very difficult to achieve.12 Each country remains responsible for its own financial stability, yet, 
where there are large cross-border institutions such stability will depend on the actions of the 
authorities in other countries. In a crisis, national authorities will tend to put their own national 
interests first, so any process of recognition of international claims in advance needs to be 
very carefully structured so that the joint actions match an agreed means of addressing and, 
where necessary, trading off the possibly conflicting interests of the countries involved.13 
The present structure of supervision, deposit insurance coverage and bank 
resolution in the EU largely follows the legal structure of banking groups. As shown in Table 1, 
prudential supervision, deposit insurance and resolution are generally the responsibility of the 
regulators of each country in which a bank is incorporated. The principal exceptions are that: 
(1) the home country supervisor of a bank parent will exercise supervisory authority over a 
bank subsidiary incorporated in another country through its supervision of the consolidated 
group and the home country supervisory may be the sole prudential supervisor if the host 
country supervisor of the subsidiary delegates its responsibility,14 and (2) the host country 
deposit insurer of a branch may supplement the coverage provided by the insurer of the 
home country of the bank to bring it up to the host country's level. 
The problem with supervising banking groups as collections of separate legal 
banking charters is that the legal approach does not reflect how these organizations 
function in practice. A well-known example of cross-border banking regional integration is 
                                                                          
11. The Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision have been revised in 2006. 
12. This mismatch of responsibilities relates to the different financial sectors –insurance, banking, securities markets– 
to the different functions –prudential supervision, deposit insurance, crisis resolution– and to the powers each holds 
under the variety of legal and regulatory systems that currently exist. 
13. If there is a threat to the financial system as a whole from bank failure or distress, countries tend to permit special 
measures to be taken, as in the case of the systemic risk exemption in the United States [Mayes (2006b)]. 
14. This delegation is contemplated in Article 131 of the Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) 
(OfficialJournal of the European Union L177/201 30 June, 2006) so called CRD. In addition, according to Article 44, the 
home country authorities are responsible for the prudential supervision of consolidated banking groups including bank 
subsidiaries and affiliates in other Member States. 
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Nordea (see Table 2), which is currently organized in the form of subsidiaries that operate with 
a highly integrated operation. This is set to go further if Nordea changes to a branch structure 
across the whole region under the European Companies Act, as currently planned. 
Indeed such a change in Nordea would make its legal form a much closer match to the 
actual structure of its current operations. It is actually an illusion that many subsidiaries 
can somehow be cut off from their parent in the event of difficulty and asked to function on 
their own, with or without statutory management [Mayes (2006a)]. As Schmidt Bies (2004) 
puts it: “entities can be created within the structure of the group to transfer and fund assets 
[that] may or may not be consolidated for accounting purposes, depending upon their 
structure.” (p.1). The idea that the various deposit insurers or supervisors can take 
independent decisions to minimize their losses in these circumstances is thus not realistic. 
The interdependence of prudential supervision of banks operating across borders 
creates a principal-agent relationship between the society (voters and taxpayers) of 
one country as principal and the various supervisors of the rest of the banking group as 
the agents.15 The delegation approach has also been used recently to debate financial 
supervisory issues [Bjerre-Nielsen (2004)]. The standard set of principal agent problems 
are made substantially worse when some of the principals have no direct authority over 
the agent, as when supervisors in one country may expose the taxpayers in another 
country to losses. The problem is that the agent’s incentives will be to follow the goals of 
the principal that has some direct authority over the agent. That is, when conflicts arise 
among the principals, the supervisor (agent) is likely to follow the perceived interests of 
their own country’s government and voters (principle). Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2006) 
describe the agency problems and conflicts of cross-border banking in general and, in 
particular, in the EU. 
                                                                          
15. See Alessina and Tabellini (2004 and 2005) for a discussion of the conditions for the delegation of the tasks to 
agents. The principal-agent problem has been broadly dealt with in the corporate governance literature in which 
the typical solutions are covenants (restricting actions of agents-managers) and bankruptcy laws (transfer of control). 
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2 SEIR /PCA as a limit on prudential supervisors’ discretion 
SEIR was first laid out by Benston and Kaufman (1988) as a means of minimizing deposit 
insurance losses by requiring a series of mandatory supervisory interventions as a bank’s 
regulatory capital ratio falls.16 Although SEIR was not intended to prevent losses due to 
massive fraud or large drops in portfolio values, it does provide a mechanism for limiting 
losses due to gradual deterioration of banks’ portfolios. One way that this proposal could 
work is illustrated in table 2 of Benston and Kaufman (1988, p. 64), in which they propose 
that banks be placed in one of four categories or tranches: 1) “No problem”, 2) “Potential 
problems” that would be subject to more intensive supervision and regulation, 3) “Problem 
intensive” that would face even more intensive supervision and regulation with mandatory 
suspension of dividends and 4) “Reorganization mandatory,” with ownership of these 
banks automatically transferred to the deposit insurer. Although the deposit insurer would 
assume control of the bank, Benston and Kaufman (1988, p. 68) ordinarily would have 
the bank continue in operation under the temporary control of the FDIC or be sold to 
another bank, with liquidation only as a “last resort”. The deposit insurer would remain at 
risk under SEIR, but only to the extent of covering losses to insured depositors. However, 
Benston and Kaufman did not expect such a takeover to be necessary, except when 
a bank’s capital was depleted before the supervisors could act, perhaps as a result of a 
massive undetected fraud. Because the bank’s owners would realize that the supervisors 
were mandated to take over a bank while it was solvent (3 percent market value of 
capital-to-asset ratio under the SEIR proposal), the owners had strong incentives 
to recapitalize, sell, or liquidate the bank rather than put it to the FDIC.17 
A version of SEIR was adopted under the title prompt corrective action (PCA) with 
the 1991 passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) as 
shown in Table 3. PCA deals with prudential supervisors´ agency problem by first allowing 
and then requiring specific intervention by the supervisory authorities on a timely basis. 
Whereas SEIR sketches out how supervisors would respond to a drop in capital 
adequacy, PCA provides a list of actions the supervisors may take and another set of actions 
the supervisor must take to further the goals of PCA (minimizing losses to the deposit 
insurance fund). While PCA reduces supervisory discretion as a bank’s capital level falls, 
supervisors retain substantial discretion over almost all banks. Even the “mandatory 
provisions” often include a significant element of supervisory discretion. For example, while an 
undercapitalized bank must submit a capital restoration plan, the supervisors have discretion 
over whether the plan will be approved as “acceptable.” 
PCA may appear to be simply a set of supervisory corrective measures that should be 
taken as a bank’s capital declines that any country could easily adopt. However, PCA is unlikely 
to work as intended if a country has not accepted PCA’s underlying philosophy or lacks the 
necessary institutional prerequisites. Focusing specifically on the EU, Nieto and Wall (2006) 
identify three important aspects of the philosophy underlying PCA: (1) “that bank prudential 
                                                                          
16. See Benston, George J. and George G. Kaufman (1988). For a discussion of the intellectual history of PCA see 
Benston and Kaufman (1994). 
17. Table 2 in Benston and Kaufman (1998) gives “Illustrative Reorganization Rules” with mandatory reorganization 
at a 3 percent market value of capital-to-asset ratio. However, the text talks about the possibility that this ratio 
should be revised upwards. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0819 
supervisor’s primary focus should be on protecting the deposit insurance fund and minimizing 
government losses,” (2) “that supervisors should have a clear set of required actions to be taken 
as a bank becomes progressively more undercapitalized,” and (3) “that undercapitalized banks 
should be closed before the economic value of their capital becomes negative.” The four 
institutional prerequisites identified are: (1) supervisory independence, and accountability;18 
(2) adequate authority,19 (3) accurate and timely information; and (4) adequate resolution 
procedures. They find that European countries currently comply with these institutional 
requirements to varying degrees. 
The adoption of a version of PCA would provide the EU with a set of minimum 
supervisory responses to violations of the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD).20 In this 
regard, PCA´s preventive approach on when and how a supervisor should intervene is broadly 
in line with the CRD approach.21 The definition and level of the capital ratios that would 
trigger mandatory supervisory action and eventually intervention are relevant subjects, 
which are beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, the original PCA was designed to 
address principal-agent problems in the supervision in the US and does not explicitly 
contemplate the complications introduced by cross-border banking groups. A number of 
authors discuss the merits of adopting PCA in the EU, including in some cases the 
recognition of the gains from using PCA in supervising cross-border groups. However, 
none of these authors [Nieto and Wall (2006); Benink and Benston (2005); Mayes (2004)] 
and policy analyst recommendations [ESFRC (2005)] explicitly consider the changes needed 
in the EU if PCA is to be effective in resolving the cross-border agency problems that 
arise in supervising cross-border banking groups. 
                                                                          
18. Independence in Nieto and Wall (2006) refers to the ability of the supervisors to intervene at troubled banks 
without the need for prior approval of the political or judicial authorities. The accountability arises ex post both in the form 
of judicial review of the legality of their intervention and to the political authorities for the appropriateness of 
their decisions. 
19. Nieto and Wall (2006) refer to the Prinicipal 22 of the Core Principles of Banking Supervision by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, which talks about “adequate supervisory measures to bring about timely corrective action 
when banks fail to meet prudential requirements .... In extreme circumstances, this would include the ability to 
revoke the banking license or recommend its revocation.” Nieto and Wall (2006) go further and support giving 
the supervisors the authority to revoke the license rather than merely recommend its revocation, as does 
Mayes et al. (2001). 
20. Directive 2006/49/EC of the European parliament and of the Council of 14 June, 2006 on the capital adequacy 
of investment firms and credit institutions (recast). Official Journal of the European Union L177/201 30 June, 2006. 
21. The general concept that supervisors should intervene promptly is reflected in three of the four principles in Pillar II of 
the Basle II. although PCA goes well beyond them because it establishes leverage ratios that require minimum 
supervisory action. Moreover, Pillar II contains neither mandatory nor discretionary provisions to replenish capital and 
turn troubled institutions around before insolvency. Also, it does not contain a closure rule. Those principles in Pillar II are 
broadly dealt with in article 124 of the CRD. This article is developed in the so called Supervisory Review Process (SRP). 
SRP requires a review and evaluation of the banks´ risk profile and management system and calls for prudential 
measures to be applied promptly. Those prudential measures include setting a capital requirement above the Pillar I 
(own funds or Tier 1). 
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3 A Prompt Corrective Action for Cross-Border Banking Groups in the EU 
Banks operating under PCA can fall into one of three categories: (1) adequate capital, 
(2) undercapitalized but still having a good chance of rebuilding its capital, and (3) sufficiently 
undercapitalized that the bank should be placed into resolution to minimize the losses. 
Cross-border banking groups that are being supervised by national banking supervisors 
introduce additional supervisory challenges in each of these three categories. The following 
subsections consider those challenges and recommends additions and modifications of PCA 
adopted with the 1991 passage of the FDICIA to address the challenges of cross-border 
groups in the EU. 
In what follows we focus on the issues to be addressed if any such scheme is to be 
workable. However, in practice the similarity in the detail of the PCA to be adopted 
by each country in respect of cross-border banks needs to be considerable if it is to work. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the same range of supervisory measures to bring about 
timely corrective action is needed. Triggers for action may readily occur elsewhere in the 
group. For example, divestiture of an enterprise in one country might be generated by 
the existence of related risks in another country. 
3.1 Assuring accurate and timely information of banking groups financial condition 
In order for bank supervisors to use their powers effectively, they must have an accurate 
understanding of the bank’s and banking group’s financial condition. A potential problem for 
a prudential supervisor of a cross-border banking group is that of determining the status 
of those parts of the group outside its supervisory control. 
In order for bank supervisors to use their powers effectively, they must have an 
accurate understanding of the bank’s and banking group’s financial condition. A potential 
problem for a prudential supervisor of a cross-border banking group is that of determining the 
status of those parts of the group outside its supervisory control. 
The need for information sharing among the supervisors is recognized in the CRD, 
Article 132, which establishes that the: 
“… competent authorities shall cooperate closely with each other. They shall provide 
one another with any information which is essential or relevant for the exercise of 
the other authorities' supervisory tasks under this Directive. In this regard, the 
competent authorities shall communicate on request all relevant information and shall 
communicate on their own initiative all essential information. […] Information shall be 
regarded as essential if it could materially influence the assessment of the financial 
soundness of a credit institution or financial institution in another Member State. In 
particular, competent authorities responsible for consolidated supervision of EU 
parent credit institutions and credit institutions controlled by EU parent financial 
holding companies shall provide the competent authorities in other Member States 
who supervise subsidiaries of these parents with all relevant information. In 
determining the extent of relevant information, the importance of these subsidiaries 
within the financial system in those Member States shall be taken into account.” 
 
This obligation for information expands to encompass also: 
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“(c) adverse developments in credit institutions or in other entities of a group, which 
could seriously affect the credit institutions; and (d) major sanctions and exceptional 
measures taken by competent authorities in accordance with this Directive, including 
the imposition of an additional capital charge under Article 136 …”. 
 
These provisions for information sharing have also been strengthened with the 
adoption of Pillar 3 of the new Capital Accord.22 For example, banks are required to report 
the total and Tier 1 capital ratios for the consolidated group and for significant bank 
subsidiaries. In this case, the host supervisors of the subsidiaries could use this information 
(that would be reflected in a market indicator) as justification for triggering consultations with 
the home country supervisor and/or for undertaking a special examination of the banking 
group.23 While the information sharing mandated by the CRD should provide national 
supervisors with the information they need, ad hoc sharing on a banking-group by 
banking-group basis is likely to be inefficient and leave room for gaps in information sharing. 
The enhanced sharing of information among supervisors is aimed at reducing 
the incentives of supervisors of the subsidiaries or parent bank to exploit the information 
to their advantage and it is a precondition for the effective implementation of PCA as 
a mechanism aimed at resolving the cross-border agency problems that arise in 
supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups. Mayes (2006c) and Vesala (2005) 
advocate a policy of information sharing via the establishment of a common data base. 
At a minimum this data base should contain quarterly consolidated financial statements 
from all insured banks and their nonbank corporate parents (when one exists) that is available 
to all bank supervisors and ideally these financial statements would be publicly 
available.24 Additionally, there would be some merit in establishing a data base with 
confidential supervisory information and analysis would also be available to the appropriate 
national supervisory agencies to assist all prudential supervisors in understanding the 
condition of the group as a whole and its relationship to the bank they each supervise. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) or the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) could harbour that database. In the case of the ECB, this responsibility would 
be consistent with article 105.5 of the EC Treaty: "the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth 
conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision 
of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system." This proposal would also require 
modification of the professional secrecy imposed by article 44 of the Directive 2006/48/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June, 2006 relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast).25  
Nieto and Wall (2006) note that the enforcement of PCA depends on the accuracy of 
reported capital adequacy ratios. They survey several studies suggesting that market signals, 
                                                                          
22. Pillar 3 aims to encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements which will allow market 
participants and foreign supervisors to assess relevant pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk 
exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution. Since domestic supervisors 
typically request additional information from the banks it is unlikely that this public disclosure will be thought sufficient. 
23. The required level of disclosure is both limited in its relevance and its timeliness [Mayes (2004)]. Mayes (2004) 
believes that the requirements fall well short of what has been required of banks in New Zealand since 1996, where 
disclosure statements are required quarterly to reveal peak exposures and where bank directors are legally liable for their 
accuracy. 
24. The U.S. has long required its banks and bank holding companies to file standardized reports of income and 
condition with their federal supervisor. These reports have been made publicly available for well over a decade, 
and are currently available at no charge on the Internet from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. For example, the 
commercial bank files (as of June 2007) are available at: 
http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/commercial_bank_data.cfm. 
25. L 177/ 1 OJ of 30 June, 2006. 
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primarily subordinated debt spreads, provide useful information about banks’ financial 
conditions and that in some cases these signals have proven more accurate than the banks’ 
reported Basel I capital ratio. These studies [e.g., Sironi (2001); Evanoff and Wall (2002); 
Llewellyn and Mayes (2004)] show that the information is sufficiently reliable for use as a 
failsafe mechanism to identify critically undercapitalized organizations. We concur that the use 
of such market risk measures would provide a valuable supplemental measure for PCA. 
Supervisors, though have been reluctant to use market signals to determine 
the capital category of banks operating under PCA. A less controversial and perhaps 
easier approach to implement would be to use market-risk measures as triggers for closer 
supervisory scrutiny of a bank. These measures could include subordinated debt spreads 
and other measures such as the pricing of credit derivatives, or equity based measures, 
such as Moody’s KMV Expected Default Frequency. The measures could be used informally 
by individual supervisors to trigger closer scrutiny of the various parts of the group. 
The use of such market measures would be consistent with Pillar 2 of the new Capital 
Accord, which requires supervisory review of bank’s reported capital adequacy and 
with Pillar 3, which seeks to encourage market discipline. Market risk measures could 
further be used to trigger a mandatory meeting of the college of supervisors (discussed in 
subsection 3.2) to review the group’s condition and, when appropriate, for triggering 
a coordinated special examination of the banking group. 
3.2 Co-ordination of PCA disciplinary measures short of resolution 
Although PCA reduces supervisory discretion, some element of discretion is inevitable. While 
a supervisor can be compelled to employ some measures, the choice of what limits the risk 
best and reduces any impending loss is bound to be substantially case specific. For example 
replacing existing management, might be essential to restore the banks´ financial health in 
some cases, but counterproductive in other cases.26 
The existence of supervisory discretion raises the possibility of a supervisor taking or 
failing to take a variety of actions that are harmful to the overall banking group but which yield 
net benefits to the supervisor’s particular country. For example, a supervisor could impose 
draconian limitations on a bank that is small relative to its financial system, even though the 
bank provides valuable services to the rest of the group elsewhere. Alternatively, a supervisor 
may forbear from disciplining or closing a bank that has a large presence in its country. Such 
forbearance could take the form of a supervisor accepting inadequate capital restoration 
plans and imposing only the minimum disciplinary measures required under PCA, even 
though additional measures are likely to be necessary to rebuild the bank’s capital. The 
consequences could be that weakness at the group level that would adversely impact 
subsidiaries (even the banking systems) in other countries and may substantially raise the 
cost of resolving the group should it become insolvent. 
The EU has some mechanisms that could be extended to provide an element of 
coordination in the use of discretionary measures. The CRD provides for some coordination 
of banks supervision and allows for the delegation of some supervisory responsibilities to 
another Member State’s prudential supervisor. Article 131 establishes that: 
                                                                          
26. As noted in the introduction, this analysis assumes the adoption of a uniform system of PCA by all EU countries so 
that the authorities in each of the EU countries would have a similar if not identical range of powers. Currently this is far 
from the case and, although the toolkit may be similar, what can or must be done in each circumstance varies 
considerably. 
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“… in order to facilitate and establish effective supervision, the competent authority 
responsible for supervision on a consolidated basis and the other competent 
authorities shall have written coordination and cooperation arrangements in place. 
Under these arrangements additional tasks may be entrusted to the competent 
authority responsible for supervision on a consolidated basis and procedures for the 
decision-making process and for cooperation with other competent authorities, may 
be specified. The competent authorities responsible for authorizing the subsidiary of a 
parent undertaking which is a credit institution may, by bilateral agreement, delegate 
their responsibility for supervision to the competent authorities which authorized and 
supervise the parent undertaking so that they assume responsibility for supervising 
the subsidiary in accordance with this Directive.” 
 
Thus, the CRD provides for a general mechanism of coordination and cooperation 
among supervisors and it also envisages a stronger form of coordination, which is the 
possibility that the host supervisor of a subsidiary may delegate its responsibility to the home 
country prudential supervisor of the subsidiary’s parent. 
The primary problem with using the authority provided by the CRD is that delegating 
supervisory responsibility to the home country supervisor of the parent bank is likely 
to worsen the principal-agent conflict between the parent’s supervisor as agent, and the 
subsidiary’s country’s taxpayers and voters, as principal. The parent’s supervisor would 
be responsible for the impact of its supervisory action on the deposit insurance fund and 
possibly the financial stability of the host country of the subsidiary, but the parent’s supervisor 
would not be directly accountable to the host country government and the taxpayers, thus 
increasing the agency problem. 
Another mechanism for coordinating discretionary PCA actions would be the 
creation of a college of the prudential supervisors of the banks in the group. The college 
would be fully compatible with Article 129 of the Directive 2006/48/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 June, 2006 relating to the pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions (recast), which envisages the cooperation of the consolidating supervisor with the 
competent authorities of the subsidiaries.27 The coordination mechanisms could be merely 
advisory, leaving the final decision up to the national supervisors of each bank, or it could be 
binding upon the members. In some cases allowing each supervisor to take disciplinary 
action would likely be acceptable, especially if the action would be unlikely to have adverse 
consequences on other group members. However, leaving the final decision in the hands of 
each bank’s national supervisor would likely not result in effective coordination to the extent 
that different supervisors reach different conclusions about the appropriate actions either 
because they have different incentives or because they have reached different judgments. 
Thus, for an effective implementation of a PCA policy as a coordination mechanism between 
supervisors, a better solution would be to give the authority to take discretionary actions that 
will be binding on all prudential supervisors in the college (see Appendix for a description of 
different scenarios of collegial binding decision). The idea behind such a grouping is that 
the supervisors can become in some sense jointly responsible for the actions the group takes. 
In such a case it may then be easier to agree to remedial actions. 
                                                                          
27. L 177/48 Official Journal of the European Union of 30 June, 2006. 
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Ideally, a college of supervisors for each cross-border banking group should be 
formed before the need arises to invoke PCA’s disciplinary provisions. However, the formation 
of a college with authority to make discretionary decisions within the PCA policy framework 
should be mandatory as soon as a bank owned by a cross-border banking group falls below 
the capital standard.28 The formation of the college does not mean that decisions will always 
be made in a timely and harmonious fashion. Even the best of colleges is likely to be an 
inefficient mechanism for addressing most issues that require consultation or negotiation 
with the banking group. For example, if a cross-border banking group with capital below 
the minimum capital requirements is required to develop a capital restoration plan that is 
acceptable to its supervisors, having the bank negotiate the plan with each of the college 
members would be slow and inefficient. Where such consultation or negotiation is required, 
a better alternative would be for the committee to select one supervisor as the primary 
contact with the bank.29 The role of the college would then be to review and approve 
the contact supervisor’s agreement with the bank. 
For a variety of reasons, a college of supervisors may at times find reaching 
a decision difficult. One way of forcing timely action would be for PCA to establish a 
presumption that a certain action will automatically be effective say 30 days after a bank 
violates one of the PCA triggers, unless the college determines that taking the action will not 
further the purposes of PCA. Similar provision is envisaged in Article 129 of the Directive 
2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June, 2006 relating to the 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), which foresees that the consolidating 
supervisor will decide in a time framework in the absence of a joint decision. This would 
prevent a subset of the college from using committee deliberations to stall effective action. 
Additionally, the colleges may somewhat reduce the scope for relatively unimportant 
disagreements to stall decision making by specifying in advance that the college will follow 
decision rules that give greater weight to the judgments of supervisors of the larger banks in 
the group and the supervisors from countries where the banking group is systemically 
important. 
 Although a college provides a mechanism for all affected countries to have a voice 
in the corrective measures´ decision taken under PCA, the college does not solve the 
agency problem caused by the mismatch between supervisory powers and supervisory 
accountability to voters. Giving each country’s supervisor a say in a coordinating college 
is not equivalent to the power that the supervisor would have to protect its country’s 
interests as it could with a purely domestic bank. However, the inability of supervisors in each 
country to have the same control as they would over a purely domestic group is an 
unavoidable consequence of groups operating as integrated entities in more than one 
Member State. Corrective measures taken (or left untaken) will have sometimes different 
consequences for different countries.30 The best that can be said is that a college structure 
will typically provide better representation of each of the affected countries than would a 
system that gives all of the power to a single supervisor, hence, reducing the agency problem 
by increasing supervisor's accountability to the government and the tax payer. 
                                                                          
28. There is a clear complexity if responsibility for ongoing supervision and resolution (whether or not least cost) 
belong to different agencies. 
29. Ordinarily the contact would be the parent’s supervisor unless the problems are focused in particular subsidiaries 
or markets. 
30. Giving every supervisor a veto over taking an action would not prevent problems if failure to act would have large 
adverse consequences for some country. Similarly, giving every supervisor a veto over failing to act would not help 
if taking a given action would have large adverse consequences for some countries. 
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3.3 Coordination of resolution 
PCA requires timely resolution, which is to say it sets a hard boundary which, when crossed 
by the bank, requires that the bank be forced into resolution.31 Timely resolution of banks can 
enhance financial stability in a variety of ways. First, the lack of a deposit insurance subsidy 
to risk taking and the threat of losing the bank’s charter may deter the bank from taking 
excess risk. If problems should arise, the bank has an incentive to quickly rebuild its capital or 
sell itself to a stronger bank before the supervisors must withdraw the bank’s charter.32 
Moreover, timely resolution should reduce or eliminate the losses to be borne by depositors, 
the deposit insurer and any non-subordinated creditors and depositors.33 This reduction in 
expected losses reduces the incentive of depositors and other non-subordinated creditors 
to run on a failing bank. Further, the reduction in expected losses to deposit insurers 
reduces the problem of allocating those losses across the various insurance schemes 
and reduces the probably that a deposit insurer would renege on its obligations. In a PCA 
cum closure rule at a positive level of regulatory capital, losses will be by definition smaller 
than in the absence of PCA to the extent that deposits would be backed by assets of at 
least the same market value, except in the case of rapid decline in asset value, massive fraud 
or inadequate monitoring by the regulatory agencies. 
If this hard boundary is to be credible, Nieto and Wall (2006) argue that it must 
be accompanied by a credible process for resolving insolvent banks, particularly. Absent a 
credible process for resolving banks, especially banks whose operation is important to the 
financial system, the supervisors are more likely to exercise forbearance than to implement 
timely closure. 
In the EU, there is no a framework of commonly accepted standards of bank 
resolution practice there is no common definition of bank insolvency nor a fully-fledged 
single legal framework or a common decision-making structure across countries. 
Hadjiemmanuil (2004) argues that a single pan-European legal and administrative 
framework for bank resolution is not only still lacking, but also it is unlikely to emerge in 
the foreseeable future. As a result, bank resolution procedures largely depend on national 
laws, which often fail to meet many of the requirements for a credible, efficient resolution 
system. Even if consideration is limited to the requirements for a large domestic bank 
group operating in a single country, most EU countries lack an adequate system. Nieto and 
Wall (2006) highlight two requirements that are generally not met by EU national resolution 
systems: (1) the need for special bankruptcy provisions for banks in which a banking authority 
is given authorization to create and operate a “bridge” or similar bank,34 and (2) a requirement 
that depositors be provided prompt access to their funds. These weaknesses in most EU 
national resolution systems are likely to give policymakers little choice but to recapitalize a 
large, banking group, even if it is deeply insolvent. 
                                                                          
31. SEIR calls its lowest category “mandatory reorganization”. Banks in PCA’s “critically undercapitalized” category are 
to have a receiver or conservator appointed within 90 days unless the supervisor can show that another action would 
better meet PCA’s goal of minimizing deposit insurance losses. 
32. Kane, Bennett and Oshinsky (2006) find evidence that distressed banks are more likely to recapitalize or sell 
themselves in the period after the adoption of PCA than in a prior period. 
33. Losses to non-subordinated creditors would necessarily be zero if banks are closed with positive levels of regulatory 
capital and accurate measures of the liquidation value of the bank were used to calculate the bank’s regulatory capital. 
More generally, the realized value of a closed bank’s portfolio may be negative due to errors in measuring portfolio 
values (including errors due to fraud) and possible losses resulting from the supervisors assuming control of the bank 
(that is, the loss of some going concern value). Nevertheless, the losses, if any, borne by the creditors and deposit 
insurer would almost surely be substantially less if banks are closed at positive values of measured economic capital 
than if the banks are not closed until after their book value of capital became negative. 
34. In the US the most obvious way to do this in the case of a large bank is to form a “bridge bank”, which is a national 
bank newly chartered by the Comptroller of the Currency under the control of the FDIC. 
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Additional problems arise if the failing banking group operates across borders and 
needs to be recapitalized or resolved. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2006) focus on the issues 
associated with recapitalizing a distressed bank that operates in two or more countries, many 
of which have parallels to the issues likely to arise when a cross-border bank is forced into 
resolution.35 The following subsection summarizes their key findings and the next subsection 
discusses how the issues would be addressed in a PCA framework. 
3.3.1 RECAPITALIZING A CROSS-BORDER BANKING GROUP IN THE ABSENCE OF PCA 
The withdrawal of the charter of a cross-border banking group, especially a large group, 
could have severe adverse consequences for the financial stability of one or more countries. 
Given the limitations of other existing EU resolution options, the only option that is likely to 
forestall financial instability may be for the affected countries to recapitalize the bank at 
taxpayer expense. However, disagreements about whether a bank should be recapitalized 
and, if so, how the burden should be apportioned are likely to delay action until the market 
losses confidence in the bank. 
By the time confidence is lost, the time for organizing a recapitalization will be 
very short (likely only a few hours) and the costs of recapitalization are likely to be a 
substantial fraction of the bank’s assets. Without any ex ante agreement on sharing 
the cost of recapitalization, the country most affected may be forced to decide whether to 
bear all of the recapitalization cost or to let the bank be forced into bankruptcy proceedings 
where liquidation is possible. While this may be the largest country, this is by no means 
certain. Nordea, for example is more important in Finland than it is in the home country, 
Sweden. Small countries may simply not have the resources for such a recapitalization and 
will hence be forced into having the crisis. 
An alternative to negotiating an agreement during a crisis would be for an ex ante 
agreement on burden sharing involving the various national ministries of finance. There are 
several ways in which such an ex ante agreement could be structured. Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker (2006) recommend that all countries in which the bank operates share the 
burden according to some measure of the operations that the bank has in their country, 
assets being their preferred measure. However, obtaining agreement on any single measure 
(a proxy) for a fair distribution may be difficult. For example, assets may not be a good proxy 
for the real and financial impact of a bank’s failure. Such impact may depend, for example, 
on the structure of the local deposit market or on the bank’s role in the country’s securities 
and derivatives markets. 
It is also not clear how decisions would be taken. Access to pubic funds is 
presumably a matter for the relevant ministries of finance. However, ministries of finance 
would no doubt want to be advised by supervisors, deposit insurers and central banks. 
Whether they should all sit round the table or whether different parties should meet for 
different purposes during the process of managing the problems is an open issue. Goodhart 
and Schoenmaker (2006) recommend that all three parties from each of the countries 
being there in addition to EU level representation from the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS), the European Central Bank, ECOFIN and the European Commission, 
                                                                          
35. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2006, p. 37) note that early closure of a bank as provided for by the U.S. version 
of PCA would “reduce the problem”. Their focus on recapitalization presumably reflects their views about the political 
viability of adopting PCA in Europe for the foreseeable future rather than its economic merits. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0819 
subject to a “de minimis” threshold of 5 percent of the group’s assets and 15 percent of the 
country’s banking assets. 
3.3.2 RESOLUTION OF A CROSS-BORDER BANKING GROUP UNDER PCA 
A version of PCA that was effective for groups operating only in one country would by itself 
substantially reduce the problems of resolving a large cross-border banking group. PCA 
provides for early resolution (charter withdrawal) before a bank can incur losses substantially 
in excess of its regulatory capital.36 At best, such a PCA would give supervisors time to 
organize an orderly resolution of a problem bank because it would result in the bank’s charter 
being withdrawn while creditors were confident the bank had sufficient assets to honor their 
claims. More likely, given the U.S. experience, some bank runs will occur because at least 
some uninsured creditors are likely to take losses in bank resolutions and will act to protect 
themselves. However, even if market participants control the timing of the bank resolution, 
PCA will still reduce the problems of resolving a failing banking group. PCA’s requirement 
that bank charters be withdrawn at positive values of bank´s regulatory capital should 
substantially reduce the losses to taxpayers and significantly reduce any conflicts over how 
best to share the burden. The losses may even be sufficiently low so that they can be 
absorbed by the banking industry through payments to their deposit insurer. 
The first part of cross-border resolution version of PCA would require that that the 
parties to the process start meeting as soon as a bank not later than when a bank falls below 
the minimum capital standard required by the CRD. When a bank falls below its minimum 
capital requirements, market participants are likely to start looking for signals that its 
resolution is imminent and that they should cut their credit exposure to the distressed bank. 
The formation of the college long before resolution becomes likely would allow all concerned 
safety net regulators to plan for the possibility that the bank will need to be recapitalized or 
resolved, without sending the signal that the supervisors consider such action likely. 
The resolution college will need to reflect the views of most, if not all, of the 
participants as noted in the Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2006) proposal. Even if the bank is 
closed without any losses to the taxpayer, at least some finance ministries/national 
central banks may need to advance funds to the deposit insurer to cover the insurer’s share 
of the losses, in part because some deposit insurers collect funds on an ex post basis. 
In theory, such support by national governments is limited by the Directive 94/19/EC on 
deposit insurance, which discourages governments from providing funding to their deposit 
insurer and support by the central bank is limited by EC Treaty (article 101). In practice, these 
restrictions may not prove viable given the importance of giving depositors immediate access 
to their funds discussed in Nieto and Wall (2006) and the limited funds available to many 
deposit insurers. 
It is likely that the balance of interests needed to be taken into account in deciding 
whether to intervene will also be appropriate for decision-making about the subsequent 
resolution of the bank. The fact that a bank had to be put into resolution suggests that a 
quick sale of the entire group is unlikely. The group is likely to have arranged such a sale 
before resolution, if that were possible. Thus, the resolution of almost all large cross-border 
groups is likely to involve their being operated as some equivalent of a bridge bank 
(or bridge banking group) pending the return of its assets to the private sector. The creation of 
a bridge banking group would be roughly equivalent to a government recapitalization of the 
                                                                          
36. Such a PCA would include a credible resolution mechanism, as advocated by Nieto and Wall (2006). 
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bank, except that the shareholders in the failed group would permanently lose their claim 
on the group and losses may be imposed on some classes of creditors.37 Someone will have 
to have managerial authority over the bank and in almost all cases the home country 
supervisor will be the logical party to appoint the new management. The bank's management 
should be overseen by a board with representatives from all of the affected countries, 
perhaps reduced by the same de minimis rule used before the bank went into resolution. 
This function can be performed by the resolution college. Whether each nation needs to be 
represented by its banking supervisor, its ministry of finance and its national central 
bank may depend on the circumstances. If the respective national ministries of finance or 
national central banks are not making an important contribution to the resolution, they 
should probably be dropped from the oversight board to help keep the size of the board 
manageable. 
The conflicts between different stakeholders will not end after the formation of a 
bridge bank.38 The managers and overseers of the bridge bank will have a variety of decisions 
to make that could provoke sharp controversies. One such decision is where the banking 
group should continue lending and where it should reduce or stop lending. Those countries 
and industries facing reduced lending may be concerned about the impact of the cuts on 
their domestic economic activity. However, having the bank continue to lend to loss-making 
geographical areas and industries is likely to provoke concerns from some college members 
about the likely losses to the bank. Another potentially controversial decision is that of closing 
some branches and subsidiaries. The managers may also recommend these closures to 
improve the efficiency of the surviving organization. Again, those countries that face the cuts 
may view the situation differently from those that are concerned about further losses. A third 
potential source of controversy is the weight given to various considerations when the group’s 
assets are returned to the private sector. Many on the board of the bridge bank (formerly 
resolution college) will likely favor accepting the highest bid for the group (or parts of the 
group) but others on the board may want to include other considerations, such as any labor 
force reductions planned by the prospective acquirers, or keeping the national charter of the 
bank. In line with the rational of our proposal, our preference would be to focus on minimizing 
the expected cost of resolution, with governments finding other, more transparent vehicles 
when required to achieve their other objectives. 
 
                                                                          
37. The shareholders would lose their claim in the sense that their control rights over the bank would be permanently 
terminated. If the proceeds from selling the group back to the private sector exceed all of the creditors’ claims on 
the bank, the excessive would be returned to the shareholders. On the other hand, any losses in excess of equity would 
be allocated to the bank’s creditors, the governments that provided assistance, and the deposit insurers. Ideally, deposit 
insurance and government assistance would be limited to covering the losses of uninsured creditors. However, the 
governments may determine that some creditors should be protected for systemic reasons. At a minimum, subordinated 
creditors who agreed to take additional risk in return for higher interest payments should lose their entire investment 
before the governments or deposit insurers absorb any losses. 
38. The same sorts of conflicts are likely to occur under the current system if the national ministries of finance decide to 
recapitalize a distressed bank. To the extent the various ministries hold a sizeable part of the bank’s stock; they will likely 
expect to participate in the decisions of the bank before privatization and also in the decisions on how best to privatize 
the bank. 
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4 Conclusion 
PCA was designed to improve the prudential supervision of banks in the U.S., most of which 
operate in a single market. An EU version of PCA could also improve the prudential 
supervision of banks operating in more than one Member State. However, to be as effective 
as possible, the EU version should address a number of cross-border issues that are 
compatible with the existing decentralized structure of the EU safety net. 
Our proposal facilitates the resolution of conflicts among supervisors of different 
countries so that the cost of reconciling the conflicts is less than the cost of going it alone. 
In this respect, PCA is a critical element of our proposal. 
Bank supervisors need to understand the overall financial condition of a banking 
group and its various individual banks if they are to effectively anticipate problems and 
take appropriate corrective measures. The effectiveness of PCA as a mechanism to reduce 
agency problems among supervisors would rely on the availability of information to prudential 
supervisors as well as supervisor's use of market information. Availability could be improved 
by reducing information asymmetries among supervisors on individual bank's financial 
condition. The use of market based risk measures could be mandated in the supervisory 
process. At a minimum, this would include requiring additional examinations of banking 
groups whose reported capital exceeds minimum required levels but which are identified 
as high risk by financial markets and mandating that the relevant banking supervisors meet to 
share their evaluations of the group. 
PCA reduces supervisors’ ability to exercise forbearance, but it by no means 
eliminates supervisory discretion. Supervisors retain substantial discretion in their 
implementation of PCA so long as a bank’s regulatory capital exceeds the critical level 
at which it is forced into resolution. If the consequences of bank supervision in one 
country can have large consequences for the group’s banks in other countries, then deciding 
how best to exercise this discretion should be decided by the supervisors of all the banks 
(or at least all of the significant banks) in a collegial format. However, even if a satisfactory 
means of deciding what to do can be implemented, the actual powers of supervisors in 
the EU are not identical. Some may not be able to implement the actions others wish to 
vote for. Hence, effective implementation would require as a precondition that prudential 
supervisors be given the same and comprehensive authority to take the corrective measures 
in PCA [Nieto and Wall (2006)]. 
Finally, should a bank that is part of an integrated cross-border banking group reach 
the point where PCA mandates resolution, its resolution could have implications for a number 
of EU countries. The timing of the resolution is unlikely to remain in the supervisor’s hands, so 
the process of making these decisions needs to begin before markets perceive that the 
bank must be resolved. The parties from each country that will play a role in the resolution 
(the banking prudential supervisor, the ministry of finance and the national central bank) 
should begin planning for the resolution with the appropriate EU institutions and the ECB no 
later than the time the bank first falls below the minimum capital adequacy requirements 
set in the CRD. In a PCA cum closure rule at a positive level of regulatory capital, losses 
would be zero to the extent that deposits would be backed by assets of at least the same 
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market value.39 In almost all cases, the best resolution of a large cross-border bank will 
involve the creation of the equivalent of a bridge bank or bridge banking group. This would 
require as a precondition special bankruptcy provisions for banks in the EU as described in 
Nieto and Wall (2006). A number of additional decisions will then be needed as to how to 
run the bridge bank(s) until its assets are returned to the private sector as well as decisions 
about how best to return the assets to private owners. Thus, on-going oversight of the bridge 
bank should be provided by a board with safety net regulators from all of the affected 
Member States (banking prudential supervisor, ministry of finance and national central bank), 
perhaps reduced by the same de minimis rule used before the bank went into resolution. 
The minimization of losses that the implementation of PCA at national level 
implies and our proposed stylized mechanism based also on the PCA policy, combine 
to improve the incentives for cooperation among prudential supervisors as well as between 
them and the deposit insurance and resolution authorities. As a result, our proposal would be 
an improvement on the existing bank resolution procedures in the EU. 
                                                                          
39. Of course, losses could be greater than zero to the extent that that asset values were not properly measured 
(for example, as could happen in the case of fraud or inadequate monitoring by supervisors) or the asset values rapidly 
decreased in value after resolution. 
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Appendix 
Potential problems and their resolution under a cross-border PCA with collegial 
binding decision making 
1. The consolidating supervisor wants to exercise forbearance [consolidating 
supervisor is taken to mean the supervisor of the parent bank (where the 
publicly traded entity is a bank) or supervisor of the lead (largest) bank where 
the publicly traded entity is a holding company].40 
If a cross-border banking group encounters problems on a consolidated basis, 
weakness at its largest bank (which may also be the parent) is likely to be the cause. 
1.A Existing Situation 
The CRD calls upon supervisors to require that banks maintain capital at least equal to the 
minimum risk-based capital ratio. If the home country consolidating supervisor (CS) wants to 
forbear, the CS can take the minimum disciplinary measures required under national law, 
even if these measures are unlikely to induce the bank to change its operations. Moreover, 
this forbearance could continue even after a bank is economically insolvent. 
One consequence of the CS being able to exercise forbearance is that a prudent 
host country prudential supervisor (PS) of a subsidiary bank would increase monitoring if 
the parent organization is undercapitalized, even if the subsidiary is in good financial 
condition. If the parent is sufficiently distressed, the host country PS of the subsidiary may 
even want to limit the subsidiary’s transactions with other subsidiaries and the parent to 
reduce the risk that the parent bank would seek to drain resources from the subsidiary 
to assist itself. Yet such prudent measures by the host country PS of the subsidiary could 
exacerbate the parent’s problems by reducing the efficiency of the group, especially to 
the extent the group functions as an integrated entity. 
Another consequence of the situation described is that the host country supervisor 
would not have the incentives to delegate the prudential supervision of the subsidiary bank to 
the CS. The host country of the subsidiary would bear full responsibility for the deposit 
insurance losses of the subsidiary bank as well as any adverse impacts on the operation 
of its financial system without having any enforcement authority over the parent bank to 
protect its interests. The CS would have the enforcement authority, but it would have 
only reputational incentives to protect the interests of the host country of the subsidiary. 
These reputational incentives may prove wholly inadequate if, as it is likely, the banking 
group in question has significant political power in its home country and thereby influence 
over the CS. 
1.B With PCA and coordination arrangements 
With PCA and a college of supervisors, the CS’s ability to forbear would be severely limited. 
The mandatory provisions of PCA would require certain action be taken based on the bank’s 
capital adequacy status. PCA would permit forbearance only in the sense that the supervisors 
                                                                          
40. We assume here that forbearance is undertaken under the genuine belief that giving time will enable the bank to 
recover and meet its obligations. Unfortunately there are examples [Mishkin (2005)] where forbearance has been 
the result of political and other direct pressure and is known not to be the loss minimizing strategy. 
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could use their discretionary authority in the most lenient manner possible, such as approving 
a capital restoration plan that appeared inadequate. However, the existence of a college 
means that the CS would have to persuade at least a majority of the college to forgo the 
discretionary disciplinary measures and to exercise leniency in implementing the mandatory 
actions. Moreover, further actions will be mandated as the bank’s capital adequacy ratios 
fall, so the CS’s and college’s opportunities for forbearance are limited unlike in the existing 
situation.41 
The limited possibilities for forbearance under PCA would make more viable the 
possibility of a host country supervisor’s delegating its responsibilities for subsidiaries 
to the CS. A host country supervisor that delegated its responsibility could do so in the 
knowledge that the CS’s ability to forbear at the expense of the subsidiary’s host country is 
greatly diminished. Host countries’ supervisors responsible for large subsidiaries relative 
to the local market may remain reluctant to delegate authority to the CS, but supervisors 
responsible for smaller subsidiaries may decide to delegate their authority having the 
certainty that supervisory action will be prompt and in the framework of the PCA mandatory 
and discretionary provisions. 
2. Home country CS wants to take aggressive corrective measures without 
adequately taking account of their impact on the host country of the subsidiary 
bank 
For example, the subsidiary may be completely dependent on its parent for 
management of its operations, managing its risks, or providing information technology 
services (including the customer databases). If the home country CS were to force the 
parent bank into the bankruptcy court, the viability of even a highly capitalized subsidiary 
in another Member State may be questionable. 
This scenario is unlikely if the banking group had a large share of the banking market 
in the CS’s home country. However, it would be possible if the group was a small part of the 
CS’s home country and the problem would be magnified if the subsidiary were an important 
part of its host country’s banking system. 
2.A Current situation 
The CS has a duty to inform the supervisors of the banking group’s subsidiaries of its 
intended action. Whether the CS has any sort of obligation to take account of the impact of 
its action on the group’s subsidiaries and their respective banking markets would depend on 
the situation. 
If the subsidiary’s PS has delegated responsibility for supervising the subsidiary to 
the home country CS, the agreement providing for the delegation most likely requires the CS 
to take account of the impact of its decisions on the subsidiary. However, the decision as to 
what sort of corrective action should be taken is ultimately a judgment call on the part 
of the CS. Hence, the agreement that the host country PS of the subsidiary has with the CS is 
                                                                          
41. Opportunities for forbearance would be more limited under PCA even if a college were not formed, or the CS would 
have veto power (as might be the case if most of the consolidated banking group’s deposits were in the home country 
and the bank were systemically important in its home country). The mandatory provisions of PCA would impose greater 
limitations on the CS than currently exist. Further, if the bank’s capital ratio were to continue to decline, PCA would force 
additional supervisory measures. 
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unlikely to contain legally enforceable obligations on the part of the CS to consider the impact 
of its actions on the subsidiaries, banking markets, and domestic economies.42 
If the subsidiary’s PS has not delegated responsibility for supervision to the home 
country CS, the CS would not have any legal obligation to consider the impact of its actions 
on the subsidiary and its domestic banking market. The CS could, and likely would, consider 
the impact of its actions on the subsidiary, even absent a legally enforceable agreement to 
do so. However, the CS is ultimately accountable to the government and taxpayers of its 
home country and not to those of the group’s subsidiary (host country). Thus, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the costs imposed on the subsidiary and the host country 
will receive substantially less weight than they would if the subsidiary were located in the 
same country as the CS. 
2.B With PCA and coordination arrangements 
PCA by itself would require certain disciplinary actions. However, with the corrective actions 
clearly established ex ante, the PS of the subsidiary would be put on early notice of the need 
to prepare to handle those actions required and authorized under PCA. 
The college of supervisors provides a mechanism that could limit the discretionary 
corrective measures that could be taken by the CS to the extent that it has effective 
powers over the national PS that would enforce the agreements at national level. Moreover, 
the college would require the home country CS to consider the impact of its actions on the 
subsidiaries before taking discretionary action. 
3. The PS of a subsidiary wants to forbear in taking corrective measures 
3.A Current situation 
The host country PS of a subsidiary has the same freedom to exercise forbearance as the 
home country CS of the parent bank. The principal difference is that the CS supervises 
the parent bank and it is also responsible for the consolidated group. Thus, the CS is in a 
position to pressure the parent bank of the banking group to take corrective action at the 
subsidiary even if the PS of the subsidiary would rather avoid or delay taking corrective action. 
3.B With PCA and coordination arrangements 
The host country PS of a subsidiary would be required to take the mandatory actions 
provided under PCA based on the subsidiary’s capital adequacy. Moreover, the college of 
supervisors where the CS would be also represented could act to limit forbearance based 
solely on the subsidiary’s regulatory capital. The college would also take into consideration 
the importance of the subsidiary activities on the banking group. 
4. The host country PS of a subsidiary bank wants to take aggressive corrective 
measures without adequately considering their impact on the rest of the group. 
This scenario is most likely to arise when the subsidiary bank is a small part of the 
financial system of the host country but it supplies critical services to the rest of the 
banking group. A possible example would be a group’s London subsidiary that exists 
primarily to facilitate the group’s access to the London wholesale financial markets. 
                                                                          
42. Where the bank is operating through branches in host countries the obligation of the lead supervisor is even less 
likely to have a formal requirement to consider the differential impact on the host. 
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In most respects, the current situation and the impact of PCA mirror the situation 
where the parent's CS wants to take aggressive corrective measures without considering the 
impact on the subsidiary's host country. The principal difference is that if the consolidated 
group is in good financial condition, it should be able to assist the subsidiary and eliminate the 
basis for the subsidiary’s PS having to take corrective action. 
4.A Current situation 
The host country PS of the subsidiary has a duty to inform the home country CS and the 
PS of a group’s other bank subsidiaries of its intended action. Like the CS in scenario 2, 
the PS of the subsidiary is likely to consider the impact of its actions on the rest of the group. 
However, the PS of the subsidiary would not have any legal obligation to weigh the impact of 
its disciplinary action on the group as it would have had if the group would have its entire 
operations in the PS’s home market. 
4.B With PCA and coordination arrangements 
As in scenario 2 with the CS, PCA would mandate certain actions by the host country PS. 
However, with the rules of supervisory action clearly established "ex ante", the home country 
CS and the host country PS of the subsidiaries in other countries would be put on early notice 
of the need to prepare for the corrective measures that may be taken against a subsidiary. 
In deciding which discretionary actions to take, the college of supervisors could 
secure that their actions would not have a negative impact on the rest of the banking group, 
always subject to the requirements of the PCA rules. The college could also be helpful 
in getting the CS and other subsidiaries PS to pressure the group into helping its 
undercapitalized subsidiary. 
5. The banking group, which has a presence in several EU countries, incurs a 
series of losses which initially drop its capital below minimum regulatory 
requirements and will eventually make the bank insolvent if not addressed. 
If the bank becomes insolvent, the home country supervisor will recognize the need for 
recapitalization. Although the exact amount of the losses is uncertain "ex ante". National 
prudential supervisors, central banks, deposit insurers and ministries of finance are 
called to agree on the resolution of the crisis and the recapitalization process. 
The home country supervisor puts the bank under special administration expecting that 
the national ministries of finance would agree on an "ex post" recapitalization that would 
allow a market friendly solution of the banking crisis. 
5.A Current situation 
The bank supervisors (CS and/or subsidiaries´ PS) will demand that the bank restores its 
capital to levels above regulatory minima. The bank may raise its capital in response, or 
it may not do so for a variety of reasons (e.g. the shareholders have lost confidence 
in the management). If the recapitalization of the bank does not succeed and the bank's 
failure appears likely, the supervisor may want to organize a recapitalization agreement 
among the national ministries of finance of the countries where the group has operations. 
However, persuading the national governments to put up taxpayers funds to support a bank, 
which has a (small) chance of surviving on its own, will be very difficult. A major problem is 
likely to be reaching an agreement on the burden sharing criteria for many possible reasons, 
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including: (a) bank's losses occurred in other country(ies) and/or, (b) the banking group is not 
considered systematically important in the host country(ies). 
Against this background, national ministries of finance may or may not reach an 
agreement. If they cannot reach an agreement and the bank continues to take losses, at 
some point market participants will lose confidence in the bank and a bank run is likely. 
After the bank run has begun, the ministries of finance will have one last opportunity to reach 
an agreement on burden sharing. At this point, the costs of recapitalization are likely to be 
high and the period of time in which to reach agreement is likely to be very short.43 If they can 
reach agreement on providing the funds, the supervisors and the ministries of finance will still 
need to agree on who will administer the bank and what priorities will be followed in restoring 
the bank's assets to the private sector. 
If the national ministries of finance still cannot reach an agreement, the home country 
supervisor (CS) will be forced to proceed to bank resolution. Deposit insurers will pay the 
insured depositors and they will be under enormous political pressure to pay also 
the uninsured depositors. 
5.B Situation with PCA (assuming closure rule at 2% of tangible equity) 
The existence of capital/assets thresholds ratios in PCA would have mandated supervisors´ 
action before the bank group's net worth would have been largely depleted. Such 
supervisory action would have ranged between asset growth and inter affiliate restrictions to 
the requirement of capital restoration by the shareholders. Prudential supervisors would 
require a recapitalization plan involving the bank's shareholders by issuing capital or selling 
assets. The bank managers and owners are also more likely to put the bank up for sale to 
avoid having its charter withdrawn when its tangible equity ratio reaches 2 percent. 
If the bank's tangible capital ratio drops below 2 percent of tangible equity, its 
supervisors must put the bank into receivership.44 If assets are being marked to market, the 
value of the bank is expected to exceed its liabilities (possibly excluding its Tier 2 liabilities).45 
The overall burden should be nil or very small. However, even in the extreme case, where 
support is required from the national ministries of finance to create a bridge bank, agreement 
is likely to be easier to reach because the losses may be sufficiently small that they could be 
covered by the national deposit insurers. Assuming the ministries of finance can reach 
agreement on any funding that is necessary, our proposal provides a structure for managing 
the bridge bank and returning its assets to the private sector. 
                                                                          
43. Market participants will not run on a bank unless they believe that they are at risk of loss, which they would be only 
if they believed that the losses were so large that the relevant Treasuries might not reach an agreement to recapitalize 
the bank. 
44. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, an important issue is the definition of the closure rule. That is, 
the definition and level of the capital ratio that would trigger resolution and the amount of time the supervisors have to 
put the bank into resolution. PCA in the US requires that a bank be classified as “critically undercapitalized” if its tangible 
equity capital to asset ratio falls below 2 percent and PCA generally requires that a bank put into resolution within 
90 days of its being classified as critically undercapitalized. An EU version of PCA could impose different requirements; 
for example, require intervention as soon as the 2% level is breached in order to increase the chance that losses can 
indeed be covered. 
45. Suppliers of Tier 2 capital should expect that their investment is at risk if their bank fails. Otherwise, their investment 
should not be included in Tier 2. 
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Table 1: Supervision, Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authorities´ Jurisdiction in 
the EU 
 
 Prudential 
Supervisor1 
Deposit Insurance 
Regulators2 
Reorganization and  
Winding-Up Authority3 
Banks locally incorporated    
 
Parent banks authorized in 
home country 
Home country 
authorizing parent bank 
(consolidated 
supervision - solvency) 
 
Home country  
 
Home country  
 
Subsidiaries of parent banks 
headquartered and 
authorized in another EU 
country 
Home country 
authorizing parent bank 
(consolidated 
supervision - solvency) 
Host country 
authorizing the 
subsidiary  
("solo" basis)4 
 
Host country  
 
 
Host country  
 
Branches    
 
Branches of banks 
headquartered and 
authorized in other EU 
country 
Home country of head 
office (consolidated 
supervision - solvency) 
Host country5 
(liquidity)  
Home country 
(possibility of 
supplementing the 
guarantee by host 
country )6 
 
Home country 
 
Source: Garcia and Nieto (2005) 
                                                 
1 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast). Official Journal of the European 
Communities 30 June 2006. L 177  
2 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May, 1994 on deposit-guarantee 
schemes. Official Journal of the European Communities 31 May, 1994, No. L135/5 and Directive 97/9/EC 
of the European Parliament and the Council of 3 March 1997 on investor-compensation schemes. Official 
Journal of the European Communities 3 May 1997 No. L 84/22.  
3 Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April on the reorganisation and 
winding up of credit institutions. Official Journal of the European Communities 5 May, 2001. L125  
4  Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) Art. 44 "[It] shall not prevent the 
competent authorities of the various Member States from exchanging information in accordance with this 
Directive and with other Directives applicable to credit institutions. That information shall be subject to the 
conditions of professional secrecy." 
5 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (art. 43.1): "[It] shall not affect the right 
of the competent authorities of the host Member State to carry out, in the discharge of their responsibilities 
under this Directive, on the-spot verifications of branches established within their territory" 
6 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May, 1994 on deposit-guarantee 
schemes. Official Journal of the European Communities 31 May, 1994. L 135. (art. 4). "…Admission shall 
be conditional on fulfillment of the relevant obligations of membership, including in particular payment of 
any contributions and other charges." 
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Table 2: Nordea; Market share in Nordic countries (%) 
 
 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Mortgage 
lending 17 32 12 16 
Consumer 
lending 15 31 11 9 
Personal 
deposits 22 33 8 18 
Corporate 
lending 19 35 16 14 
Corporate 
deposits 22 37 16 21 
Investment 
funds 20 26 8 14 
Life & 
pension 15 28 7 3 
Brokerage 17 5 3 3 
Mayes (2006) 
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Table 3 
Mandatory and Discretionary Provisions Prompt Corrective Action 
 
 
   Capital Ratios 
   Risk-Based Capital Leverage 
Category Mandatory Provisions Discretionary Provisions Total Tier 1 Ratio 
Well Capitalized No capital distribution or payment of management fees 
that would cause the bank to become undercapitalized 
 >10% >6% >5% 
      
Adequately 
capitalized 
1. Same as well capitalized  >8% >4% >4% 
      
Undercapitalized 1. Capital distributions and management fees suspended 1. Require recapitalization by issuing capital or selling to 
another firm 
<8% <4% <4% 
 2. Capital restoration plan 2. Restricting transactions with affiliates    
 3. Asset growth restricted 3. Restricting rates on new deposits    
 4. Prior approval for branching, acquisitions, and new 
lines of business 
4. Restricting asset growth    
 5. No brokered deposits 5. Restricting Activities    
  6. Improving management by replacing directors or managers    
  7. Prohibit deposits from Correspondent banks    
  8. Requiring prior approval for capital distribution by bank 
holding company 
   
  9. Requiring Divestiture    
      
Significantly 
Undercapitalized 
1. Same as Undercapitalized  <6% <3% <3% 
 2. At least one of the 9 discretionary provisions under 
Undercapitalized. Presumption in favor of (1) 
(required capital issuance only), (2), and (3). 
    
 3. Senior officer compensation restricted     
      
Critically 
Undercapitalized 
1. Any action authorized for significantly 
undercapitalized banks 
   <2%** 
 2. Payments on subordinated debt prohibited*     
 3. Conservatorship or receivership within 90 days*     
* Not required if certain conditions are met  
** Tangible equity only 
Note, this is a general summary of PCA only. Other parts of the U.S. Code may also impose limits based on a bank’s capital category. 
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